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Moral philosophers, like other professional groups, 
use a body of technical terminology. Some of this 
technical vocabulary is too unusual to be misappre-
hended. 'Deontology' and 'consequentialism', for 
examples, have no normal English uses and so are 
unlikely to confuse an outsider. (Obscurity, yes, butnot 
confusion.) Confusion is much more likely when a 
technical term also has non-technical uses. Such 
confusion, I fear, fairly frequently arises in connection 
with the terms 'utilitarianism' and 'utilitarian'. 
'Utilitarianism' in moral philosophy refers to a 
theory of right action classically developed by Jeremy 
Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and Henry Sidgwick. On 
this theory the right act to choose in any situation is the 
one that will produce the greatest balance of pleasure 
over pain for all affected beings. If no act is available 
that will produce net pleasure, that act is right that will 
produce the least net pain. 
Utilitarianism comes in many forms (probably 
over a hundred ifone counts all the variants), depending 
on whether the principle is applied to choices of acts or 
choices ofrules, on how broadly or narrowly 'pleasure' 
and 'pain' are understood, on whether it is pleasure or 
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preference satisfaction that is to be maximized, on 
how wide a scope is covered by 'all affected beings', 
on whether it is a matter of actual or of expected 
consequences, and so on. 
Utilitarianism in all its forms is a consequen-
tialist theory: what makes right acts right is their 
consequences. 
Very few modem moral philosophers are indifferent 
to utilitarianism. The theory, in its many versions, 
has lots of champions. Peter Singer is probably the 
unabashed utilitarian best known to animal people. 
Tom Regan is one of many who think utilitarianism 
deeply mistaken. A third large group, of which I am a 
member, think that utilitarianism is almost surely part 
ofany acceptable moral theory, but not the whole story. 
Among moral philosophers the word 'utilitarian' 
serves as an adjective meaning something like 'of the 
sortconnected with utilitarianism' and as a nounreferring 
to proponents of utilitarianism. 
In the nonacademic world the 'utilitarianism' has 
no ordinary use. The word 'utilitarian' serves as an 
adjective describing an attitude. To take a utilitarian 
attitude toward something is to value it only for its ( 
usefulness (utility) as a means to some end. One takes 
a utilitarian attitude to other people if one considers 
them important only insofar as they impede or facilitate 
one's own (or one's cause's) pleasure, promotion, or 
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power. A utilitarian attitude toward a tree values the 
tree, if at all, as lumber. or perhaps as shade. but not for 
its beauty and certainly not for its own sake. The 
utilitarian attitude toward animals is demonstrated by 
factory farms and the naming of state departments of 
'natural resources'. 
Utilitarianism, in most of its versions, is directly 
opposed to such a utilitarian view of animals. The 
pleasure and pain (or satisfaction and frustration) of 
sentient beings is directly valued (positively or 
negatively) by utilitarianism. The suffering ofanimals 
matters directly. No real utilitarian (proponent of 
utilitarianism) takes a utilitarian attitude (all that matters 
is usefulness) toward a sentient being. 
The confusion of the two senses of 'utilitarian' is 
made even more likely by a common objection to 
utilitarianism. This objection is that utilitarianism would 
in many circumstancesrequire thesacrificeofa minority 
to maximize the satisfactionsofthe majority. Maybe so, 
maybe not (the literabJre on the argument is immense). 
But even in such a case utilitarianism requires that the 
interests of all be taken equally into account. No 
affected sentient being can be treated just as a means to 
the ends of others. 
Whatever else they may do, utilitarians don't take 
a merely utilitarian view of animals. 
SOCIETY FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICS AND ANIMALS 
EASTERN, PACIFIC, AND CENTRAL DIVISIONS 
The Society for the Study of Ethics and Animals meets 
in conjunction with the divisional meetings of the 
American Philosophical Association. Papers are 
hereby invited for the December, 1991, Eastern 
meeting, the March, 1992. Pacific meeting, and the 
April, 1992, Central meeting. 
Papers are welcome on any topic connected with 
ethical issues affecting nonhuman animals. Possible 
topics include: 
• The moral (in)significance ofbeing natural (rather 
than domesticated or genetically engineered) 
• The consonance (or lack thereof) ofAnimal Liber-
ation Front actions with 11n animal rights ethic 
• Historical studies of conceptions of the moral 
standing of animals 
• Animals and the action ethics/virtue ethics 
distinction 
• The importance of animal issues to philosophy 
and philosophers 
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• Companion animals and paternalism 
• The ethics and epistemology of animal research 
and soon. 
The Society employs a system of blind reviewing for 
the selection ofpapers for its programs. Papers must 
be ten to fifteen pages long. double-spaced. Three 
copies are required. with the author's name and any 
other identifying infonnation on a separate title page. 
Send papers to Professor Harlan B. Miller, Society for 
the Study of Ethics and Animals. Department of 
Philosophy, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State 
University, Blacksburg. Vrrginia 24061-0126. Be 
sure to indicate which meeting is desired. Volunteers 
to comment on papers should submit their names to 
the same address. Deadlines are as follows: 
1991 Eastern meeting March 15, 1991 
1992 Pacific meeting September 1, 1991 
1992 Central meeting September 1, 1991 
Papers accepted for meetings will automatically be 
considered for publication in Between lilli. Species. 
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